It is a scary thought that "Bush's popular image" as "The Dumb Jock" is "hardly a source of source of shame" (p. 2). It is even scarier that "Bush's miscommunications are more than rhetorical blunderings" (p. 2). As is argued in the Edbauer Rice piece "Executive Overspill: Affective Bodies, Intensity. and Bush-in-Relation," these attributes and faults have worked to our former president's advantage. As posited in the piece, these characteristics present problems for "cultural theory, as well as the political left" (p. 2). This is an effective iteration of the issues associated with Bush's presidency as a reflection on the American public, as well as a legitimate basis for questioning the public's ability to sustain a proper democracy.
"Executive Overspill" attempts to explain the counterintuitive functionality of Bush's idocracy via affect. The author states:
"I can think of no better exemplar than Bush, who is certainly not describable only in terms of qualification. (Has one ever seen a more unqualified executive body?) Calling on this body, then, I want to extend Massumi's call for the creation of a cultural vocabulary of affect by tracing three lines, three key terms, of the affective body: relational intensity, the sensation of involvement, and thought-impingement. I argue that we must begin to develop a cultural-theoretical vocabulary of and for affective bodies beyond those existing vocabularies of signification. Not only can such vocabularies bring both halves of the event into focus, but this exploration also offers a material re/description of the (political) body as an effect of affect. Moreover, this reading does not apply merely to President Bush's decomposing body, but to cultural theory as such. In other words, a bodily theory of affect can become a launching pad for a more complete response to cultural-political scenes. What follows is a thus a double gesture of analysis: I want to generate an affective vocabulary via the spectacle of Bush's decomposing body, as well as a reading of this body across our developing vocabulary of affect. I suggest that such vocabularies can only be generated in a simultaneous co-emergence with(in) sites of cultural analysis. They emerge, that is, through unqualified exemplars" (p. 6).
I feel that this proposal comes from a position that relies far to heavily on an inaccurate understanding of the American public. The complex nature of this proposal incorporates elements of explanation and resolution that is rooted in a higher level of thinking that cannot be understood or utilized by the masses. This also seems to be logic which, in my opinion, complicates the understanding of Bush's bizarrely successful embrace of the role of "the village idiot." Is it that Rice wants to understand the issue at hands in terms only accessible to the intellectual elite? I fail to see the value of the "creation of a cultural vocabulary" as anything more than a means of unnecessary description. A good analogy for this would be the technology divide that exists between the rich and the poor. Society has a incredibly uneven distribution of access to new technologies. I feel that there is a simliar problem associated with education, and there would be a similar problem with Rice's "cultural vocabulary." It would not be something that most people would be able to relate to or understand, most American's already have a poor vocabulary already.
Friday, May 6, 2011
Wednesday, May 4, 2011
Nussbaum
Emotions are internal by nature but are experienced because of our relationship with external contingencies. The emotions we feel come from the ability to relate; to impose situations onto ourselves. Aristotle describes love as the acknowledgement of one’s own faults and finding compliments to these in other people. He describes fear and pity as “acknowledging our vulnerability…only if we really do think that life can do something us, and that this something matters (pg. 312).” Before one can take action, whether it is to start a fight or to fall in love, one must be able to acknowledge his/her own vulnerabilities. A somewhat cliché, yet easily graspable, example would be the concept of donation. In order for a passerby to feel compelled to give a homeless man on the street a dollar, the giver must acknowledge that the homeless man’s plight is something that could in fact happen to his/her own life. If the passerby does not recognize this as a possibility, he/she will not feel inclined to assist.
However, there are many negative consequences to this interconnectedness that drives emotion. We impose others’ circumstances onto ourselves, driving our sense of fear, hate, love, ect. In doing this we inevitably, and often, take action based on completely external possibilities. Certainly this can be seen as a potentially dangerous scenario. This leads into Plato’s idea that “a good person is completely sufficient to himself for good living (pg. 313).” In Plato’s Republic he describes a world where people do not sacrifice virtue for any reason. If people enforced this belief, emotions would virtually disappear. He makes the point that in order to be a truly virtuous human being, one must not be manipulated by emotions; of course to not be manipulated by them would mean they must somehow not exist. In order for emotions to not exist, since we have identified them as being products of outside forces, the virtuous man must recognize that “nothing among human things is worth much seriousness (pg. 313).” Only then would people be able to act solely for themselves, free from the affect of others. It is worth noting that if this were the case, our beliefs about love would, too, be shattered as love is an incredible attachment to another being, leaving people vulnerable to all sorts of actions and emotions.
Fusing both Socrates’ and Plato’s examples, emotions can be deemed as rational in the context that we are inevitably connected to other people, though they seem almost irrational for this same reason. We will be driven by the affect of outside forces but is this really necessary? Would individuals and society both be better off by a lack of emotional response or would it suffer from the consequential lack of interconnectedness?
Though I sense the allure of shrugging off circumstances I cannot control with little affect on my emotional state, I personally fall more on the side of Socrates. I find an importance to recognizing the greatness that can come from being affected by other, especially in the vein of pity and love. Though many horrific acts (war, murder, genocide, revenge) can come from this affect, so too can many acts of greatness (meaningful relationships, charity, relief, civil rights). In my personal life I’d like to find a balance between the two philosophies. Ideally, I would like to acknowledge the power of other’s on my emotions so that I can logically sift through them, deciding when it is acceptable to act on this affect and when to simply walk away from negativity. Being aware of Socrates’ observation, and keeping Plato’s solution in mind, I feel it is possible to, not control my emotions but, have the ability to understand their origins and in turn act only as I would logically want to act under my own definition of personal “virtue”.
However, there are many negative consequences to this interconnectedness that drives emotion. We impose others’ circumstances onto ourselves, driving our sense of fear, hate, love, ect. In doing this we inevitably, and often, take action based on completely external possibilities. Certainly this can be seen as a potentially dangerous scenario. This leads into Plato’s idea that “a good person is completely sufficient to himself for good living (pg. 313).” In Plato’s Republic he describes a world where people do not sacrifice virtue for any reason. If people enforced this belief, emotions would virtually disappear. He makes the point that in order to be a truly virtuous human being, one must not be manipulated by emotions; of course to not be manipulated by them would mean they must somehow not exist. In order for emotions to not exist, since we have identified them as being products of outside forces, the virtuous man must recognize that “nothing among human things is worth much seriousness (pg. 313).” Only then would people be able to act solely for themselves, free from the affect of others. It is worth noting that if this were the case, our beliefs about love would, too, be shattered as love is an incredible attachment to another being, leaving people vulnerable to all sorts of actions and emotions.
Fusing both Socrates’ and Plato’s examples, emotions can be deemed as rational in the context that we are inevitably connected to other people, though they seem almost irrational for this same reason. We will be driven by the affect of outside forces but is this really necessary? Would individuals and society both be better off by a lack of emotional response or would it suffer from the consequential lack of interconnectedness?
Though I sense the allure of shrugging off circumstances I cannot control with little affect on my emotional state, I personally fall more on the side of Socrates. I find an importance to recognizing the greatness that can come from being affected by other, especially in the vein of pity and love. Though many horrific acts (war, murder, genocide, revenge) can come from this affect, so too can many acts of greatness (meaningful relationships, charity, relief, civil rights). In my personal life I’d like to find a balance between the two philosophies. Ideally, I would like to acknowledge the power of other’s on my emotions so that I can logically sift through them, deciding when it is acceptable to act on this affect and when to simply walk away from negativity. Being aware of Socrates’ observation, and keeping Plato’s solution in mind, I feel it is possible to, not control my emotions but, have the ability to understand their origins and in turn act only as I would logically want to act under my own definition of personal “virtue”.
Ahmed - Affective Economies
Ahmed argues that emotions are not simply generated from within, but that they gain power from the interaction and connectedness of people. She even deems this circulation of emotions a functioning economy where emotions are not just experienced, but that they are constantly being exchanged between people. Ahmed heavily builds her argument on how emotions affect people by blurring the lines between hate and love. People do not form ideas like prejudices and extreme political opinions simply from an irrational hatred toward foreign people or concepts but instead because people love, and fear losing, what they personally have. To use her example of the white working man who “hates” the Mexican immigrant, he only appears to hate because he loves his home, his family, his well-being and sees the immigrant as a threat to the very foundation of all of this- his job. It is this love for his life, and the fear of losing what he loves, from which the negative behavior spawns.
Much of emotion is based on theoretical, or perceived, circumstances. The white man feels a connection with being white. He associates certain things with being white and he loves these things as they are a part of him; thus white becomes his imagined community. “The passion of these negative attachments to others is redefined simultaneously as a positive attachment to the imagined subjects brought together through the repetition of the signifier, ‘white.’ It is the shared ‘communal’ visceral response of hate. Together we hate, and this hate is what makes us together (pg. 118).” This community is, as she states, a fantasy; it is merely imagined. But the imagination can be powerful, especially when it concerns one’s personal well-being, and certainly powerful enough to generate hatred. People are connected with their fantastical communities as well as their fellow human beings. Thus it is only logical that if a person feels a threat to one of his/her communities that he/she will find another being or community to blame. Ahmed sums this up with “The bodies of others are transformed into the ‘hated’ through a discourse of pain. They are assumed to ‘cause’ injury to the ordinary white subject, such that their proximity is read as the origin of bad feeling: indeed, the implication here is that the white subject’s good feelings (love, care, loyalty) are being ‘taken’ away by the abuse of such feelings by others.” She suggests that emotions are an economy because they do not just affect individuals, they actually bind people and drive interactions.
Taking this idea to its logical conclusion, people can easily be manipulated by playing on their idea of love. If someone can make you believe you can lose what you love, they can make you believe that you hate. The very nature of her “economic” argument suggest that people are innately susceptible to forming opinions or taking action based on how others affect them, even if the affect is only just perceived.
A relevant example of this power is the modern war on terrorism. I do not aim to impose any personal opinions on the matter but, instead, apply Ahmed’s perspective. With this I consider how much of the average American’s alliance with this “war” comes simply from inflamed hatred caused by the perceived fear of losing things they love. As I see it, this idea can be applied on two important levels. One: average Americans align themselves with being American. If terrorists can be made into a threat to American ideals (freedom, liberty, happiness) they can become hated. Two: average Americans love their own life as well as the lives of those close to them. If terrorists can be seen as having the potential to end any of these lives, they can be hated. These two concepts allow for the “war on terror” to exist with support. Whether or not these terrorists will actually do real damage to either of these associations is irrelevant, the perceived threat is enough to cause hate and war.
The war on terror also ties into Ahmed’s idea of community. In order for there to be war, sides must be established. These sides become theoretical communities. In order to make them an enemy, terrorists must be definable, sharing common traits and ideas. Likewise, in order to be the “good guys”, Americans must define themselves as well. What is poignant about this real-life application of Ahmed’s ideas is that since community and fear is mostly perceived, people will extend their hate to anyone who carries any of the defining characteristics of this terrorist community. Being simply Muslim or middle-eastern can quickly make you categorize you as the perceived enemy. Questioning the war or America’s actions, can also label you as the enemy. Though Ahmed articulates that forming communities and exchanging emotions with others is inevitable, I believe the potential to manipulate love into hatred can turn into a slippery slope of over-generalization, irrelevant communities, and an abundance of hate.
Massumi
I had a hard time finding any profound meaning in Massumi's example, which is heavily relied on to support his claim, about the snowman video. It seemed to me that he was essentially elongating and complicating the reason why it is taboo to ruin the end of a movie for someone who has yet to see the film for themselves. He describes the study done with the snowman video and that asserts the following claim:
"...it may be noted that the primacy of the affective is marked by a gap between content and effect: it would appear that the strength or duration of an image's effect is not logically connected to the content in any straightforward way" (p. 24).
It seems a bit unfounded to make this claim based on the study that he presented. The affective nature of children can not, in my opinion, be used as legitimate evidence to substantiate the aforementioned claim. While I do not disagree with what he is saying, I disagree with the the study cited as a proof. However, I can identify personally with "'sad' scenes" being "rated the most pleasant" (p. 23). I find that when I watch a film or read a book, I remember most those which make me feel something. While, for me, this does not HAVE to be something that would be considered "sad," intense emotions, no matter what type of emotion they may be, resonate within me and are remembered for longer durations of time. I have always defined my affinity toward any particular form of entertainment by its ability to provoke any strong emotion or feeling within me. For me, the ability of something to provoke an intense, particular sensation is the essence of art. When a distinct sensation is evoked within me I am able to relish in how I am able to identify with the art and not only remember it, but take something away from it as well. He states that "matter-of-factness dampens intensity" (p. 25). This does not strike me as something particularly interesting or noteworthy. It seems obvious that when the imagination is allowed to operate freely, any form of entertainment is more likely to evoke a stronger emotional response. This is in essence the reason why we tend to enjoy surprise endings.
I also find his reasoning for causality unfounded. It seems to me, and this is why I do not consider children sufficient test subjects, that the "primacy of the affective" would vary on an individual basis. This is not to say that people do not operate and react in similar fashions, but rather that there are more profound implications of affect when studying individuals with more refined tastes. There is a reason that Hollywood is able to churn out profit making blockbusters, and that would be the aforementioned tendency for the masses to respond in generally similar ways. Thus, his study of children could be applied to "the masses," but could not serve as a basis to describe the "primacy of affect" beyond individuals that identify with the majority. For the rhetor, this study has profound implications yet doesn't appear to be anything that isn't already known. In my mind the conformity of mass opinion is created by the institutions that stand to profit from mass consumption (a relevant example being media conglomerates). Profits are always greater when a large number of people partake in the same activity. When we look at the radio, television, and film industry we find a small number of corporations controlling almost all of the content. Massumi's point becomes something that is already well known, as well as something that is socially constructed. When people rely upon institutions that stand to gain the most from homogenized tastes and opinions the variety of art, and peoples exposure to anything outside of the institutions interests, becomes marginalized. There is a trend of homogeneous taste and response because exposure has become homogenized as a result of the control exerted upon the means of delivering content. As stated before, this is meaningful for the rhetor. However, this is one of my fundamental issues with the way in which rhetoric attempts to understand human beings, and in turn what makes Massumi's point irrelevant to my interests.
I propose that rhetoric attempt to study human beings on hypothetical grounds; a study which embraces progressive measures to deter conformity and as a result foster creativity and originality. These grounds would extend beyond the capacity to predict and manipulate the current socially constructed mentality of the masses that allows for rhetoric, and Massumi's argument, to exists as they do.
"...it may be noted that the primacy of the affective is marked by a gap between content and effect: it would appear that the strength or duration of an image's effect is not logically connected to the content in any straightforward way" (p. 24).
It seems a bit unfounded to make this claim based on the study that he presented. The affective nature of children can not, in my opinion, be used as legitimate evidence to substantiate the aforementioned claim. While I do not disagree with what he is saying, I disagree with the the study cited as a proof. However, I can identify personally with "'sad' scenes" being "rated the most pleasant" (p. 23). I find that when I watch a film or read a book, I remember most those which make me feel something. While, for me, this does not HAVE to be something that would be considered "sad," intense emotions, no matter what type of emotion they may be, resonate within me and are remembered for longer durations of time. I have always defined my affinity toward any particular form of entertainment by its ability to provoke any strong emotion or feeling within me. For me, the ability of something to provoke an intense, particular sensation is the essence of art. When a distinct sensation is evoked within me I am able to relish in how I am able to identify with the art and not only remember it, but take something away from it as well. He states that "matter-of-factness dampens intensity" (p. 25). This does not strike me as something particularly interesting or noteworthy. It seems obvious that when the imagination is allowed to operate freely, any form of entertainment is more likely to evoke a stronger emotional response. This is in essence the reason why we tend to enjoy surprise endings.
I also find his reasoning for causality unfounded. It seems to me, and this is why I do not consider children sufficient test subjects, that the "primacy of the affective" would vary on an individual basis. This is not to say that people do not operate and react in similar fashions, but rather that there are more profound implications of affect when studying individuals with more refined tastes. There is a reason that Hollywood is able to churn out profit making blockbusters, and that would be the aforementioned tendency for the masses to respond in generally similar ways. Thus, his study of children could be applied to "the masses," but could not serve as a basis to describe the "primacy of affect" beyond individuals that identify with the majority. For the rhetor, this study has profound implications yet doesn't appear to be anything that isn't already known. In my mind the conformity of mass opinion is created by the institutions that stand to profit from mass consumption (a relevant example being media conglomerates). Profits are always greater when a large number of people partake in the same activity. When we look at the radio, television, and film industry we find a small number of corporations controlling almost all of the content. Massumi's point becomes something that is already well known, as well as something that is socially constructed. When people rely upon institutions that stand to gain the most from homogenized tastes and opinions the variety of art, and peoples exposure to anything outside of the institutions interests, becomes marginalized. There is a trend of homogeneous taste and response because exposure has become homogenized as a result of the control exerted upon the means of delivering content. As stated before, this is meaningful for the rhetor. However, this is one of my fundamental issues with the way in which rhetoric attempts to understand human beings, and in turn what makes Massumi's point irrelevant to my interests.
I propose that rhetoric attempt to study human beings on hypothetical grounds; a study which embraces progressive measures to deter conformity and as a result foster creativity and originality. These grounds would extend beyond the capacity to predict and manipulate the current socially constructed mentality of the masses that allows for rhetoric, and Massumi's argument, to exists as they do.
Brennan Ch. 5-7
"In positing that people in the Western world were once aware of the transmission of affect, and that we have been sealed against this knowledge by the deadening, passifying affects of modern times, I have implied that knowledge of transmission was once conscious, although that knowledge is now repressed. Accordingly, the problem of how we discern becomes more acute in modern context" (p. 117).
While I do not agree with Brennan's "discernment" process, I do find a lot of truth in her description of the Western world becoming "sealed against this knowledge" of affect. It seems that as people have moved toward ideologies which advocate the progress of the individual by the individual. This mentality is, in large, what creates a resistance to ideas such as affect. People experience a detachment from concepts of human connectedness when society functions in a manner that resists unity and advocates individualism. It becomes difficult to advocate the advancement of the individual by the individual when ideas such as a affect suggest a connectedness that goes so far beyond any one individual.
"By examining the affects experienced in judging another, one learns a great deal about how the illusion of self-containment is purchased at the price of dumping negative affects on that other. The dyadic and complex level of affective transmission is marked in terms of how it is that one part carries the other's negative affects; his aggression is experienced as her anxiety and so forth. By means of this projection, on believes oneself detached from him or her, when one is, in fact, propelling forward an affect that he will experience as rejection or hurt, unless he has shielded himself against these affects by similar negative propulsion, a passionate judgment of his own" (p. 119)
I find this description of projection to be an accurate explanation of the consequences associated with the misinterpretation of affect, specifically in instances characterized by the emphasis put on individualism by the Western world. Brennan argues that by resisting affect in the wrong way (essentially not understanding, acknowledging, or accepting it) one begins to project negative affects outward. When one is only capable of understanding one's self as a contained unit, one becomes susceptible to projection of the negative. If the individual is able to realize itself as part of a much larger system of connectedness, he or she is able to utilize affect in a positive way. Put differently, rather associating negative affects with others one is able to identify with their own particular sense of self at a particular moment. This is something that is far more manageable. If one is able to stop blaming others for their own particular demeanor they can prevent negativity in the future. So long as affect is harbored via projection, progress within one's self becomes impossible. This is because the individual is not able to completely control, explain, or fully understand what someone else is experiencing. It becomes necessary to accept affect, in part, as something that you are experiencing. It is also necessary to disassociate the cause of affect from the individuals around you. Individual progress is heavily dependent upon correctly interpreting, understanding, and controlling affect.
While I do not agree with Brennan's "discernment" process, I do find a lot of truth in her description of the Western world becoming "sealed against this knowledge" of affect. It seems that as people have moved toward ideologies which advocate the progress of the individual by the individual. This mentality is, in large, what creates a resistance to ideas such as affect. People experience a detachment from concepts of human connectedness when society functions in a manner that resists unity and advocates individualism. It becomes difficult to advocate the advancement of the individual by the individual when ideas such as a affect suggest a connectedness that goes so far beyond any one individual.
"By examining the affects experienced in judging another, one learns a great deal about how the illusion of self-containment is purchased at the price of dumping negative affects on that other. The dyadic and complex level of affective transmission is marked in terms of how it is that one part carries the other's negative affects; his aggression is experienced as her anxiety and so forth. By means of this projection, on believes oneself detached from him or her, when one is, in fact, propelling forward an affect that he will experience as rejection or hurt, unless he has shielded himself against these affects by similar negative propulsion, a passionate judgment of his own" (p. 119)
I find this description of projection to be an accurate explanation of the consequences associated with the misinterpretation of affect, specifically in instances characterized by the emphasis put on individualism by the Western world. Brennan argues that by resisting affect in the wrong way (essentially not understanding, acknowledging, or accepting it) one begins to project negative affects outward. When one is only capable of understanding one's self as a contained unit, one becomes susceptible to projection of the negative. If the individual is able to realize itself as part of a much larger system of connectedness, he or she is able to utilize affect in a positive way. Put differently, rather associating negative affects with others one is able to identify with their own particular sense of self at a particular moment. This is something that is far more manageable. If one is able to stop blaming others for their own particular demeanor they can prevent negativity in the future. So long as affect is harbored via projection, progress within one's self becomes impossible. This is because the individual is not able to completely control, explain, or fully understand what someone else is experiencing. It becomes necessary to accept affect, in part, as something that you are experiencing. It is also necessary to disassociate the cause of affect from the individuals around you. Individual progress is heavily dependent upon correctly interpreting, understanding, and controlling affect.
Brennan Ch. 3 - 4 - Crowds Are Composed of Mad Individuals
I found a particular segment of Brennan's description of "Transmission in Groups" particularly interesting.
"Floyd Allport was the first to reject Le Bon's and McDougall's 'group fallacy' or 'the error of substituting the group as a whole as a principle of explanation.' Only individuals, Allport believed (as did others) have minds. Nonetheless, these individuals are predisposed in similar ways to satisfy their basic drives. Crowds sometimes offer them an opportunity to find this satisfaction: 'The menacing and the drives of a large number of individuals simultaneously both draws them together and incites them to common action.' 'The individual sees with his own eyes that others are delivering the blow he longs to deliver, and are thereby expressing, not disapproval of acts of violence, but the strongest kind of approval.' Critically, the crowd adds nothing new to what the individual would do if her were by himself. The individual 'behaves just as he would behave alone, only more so.' He behaves 'more so' because 'the sights and sounds facilitate an increased fervor in the responses of each'" (p. 59-60).
I find this notion of crowd behavior particularly interesting when I think about the two distinct ways in which I experience affect in groups. The first way is in a situation which inherently makes me uncomfortable, a good example being the nature of the crowd at UT Football game. I quote by singer/songwriter Julian Casablancas effectively sums up my sentiments toward the competitive nature of the crowd at a football game, it reads as follows:
"Where cities come together to hate each other in the name of sport, America"
I often feel that the aggression associated with sports is unnecessary. Of the few football games I have attended, I rarely saw legitimate competition with UT's highly talented team. It often seems as though there are a large number of UT fans shouting rather derogatory and hateful chants at the other team, even though there are very few fans supporting the other team. It is clear to me that the other school does not take football nearly as seriously, and thus the thousands of UT fans shouting "make 'em eat shit" makes me uncomfortable.
My initial reaction the excerpt from "The Transmission of Affect" was that it was inaccurate, because in these situations I often find myself reacting in a hypersensitive nature opposite to that of the rest of the crowd. However, after thinking about it more it rings true that "The individual 'behaves just as he would behave alone, only more so.'" I feel uncomfortable toward the crowd mentality associated with sporting events when I simply think about everything that goes into the crowds mentality and behavior. Therefore, actually being at the sporting event the way I would be have alone becomes increased quite a bit. I experience the affective nature of the crowd and become increasingly introverted toward the crowd mentality.
The second way is a situation in which I have preconceived notions about enjoying the affect of the crowd. A good example of this would be a concert that I have sought out and have excitement about attending. I do not find myself at all uncomfortable or in opposition with the crowds affect. I embrace it, and the way in which I think about how I would like to be when listening to whatever music becomes heightened. Put differently, I feel more capable of dancing or singing along that I might if I were along or with a small group of friends.
I find the idea of expectations and opinions about the crowd mentality to be an interesting component of transmission in groups. This expands upon thoughts I have about the extent to which affect can effect the individual based on the particular way in which the individual orients him/herself respective to the crowd. This also supports Brennan's notion that affect can be controlled, in the instance of transmission in crowds it seems that affect is "controlled" without any conscious effort being exerted upon it. However, since this is an unconscious interpretation of the affect, it is not a proper form of control. The affect is still consuming the individual, even if the individual is not responding in accordance with the rest of the crowd. So affect is thwarted, not controlled.... but this supports the notion that affect is not homogeneous of forcefully encompassing, unless no effort is to taken to make it function to the contrary.
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