It is a scary thought that "Bush's popular image" as "The Dumb Jock" is "hardly a source of source of shame" (p. 2). It is even scarier that "Bush's miscommunications are more than rhetorical blunderings" (p. 2). As is argued in the Edbauer Rice piece "Executive Overspill: Affective Bodies, Intensity. and Bush-in-Relation," these attributes and faults have worked to our former president's advantage. As posited in the piece, these characteristics present problems for "cultural theory, as well as the political left" (p. 2). This is an effective iteration of the issues associated with Bush's presidency as a reflection on the American public, as well as a legitimate basis for questioning the public's ability to sustain a proper democracy.
"Executive Overspill" attempts to explain the counterintuitive functionality of Bush's idocracy via affect. The author states:
"I can think of no better exemplar than Bush, who is certainly not describable only in terms of qualification. (Has one ever seen a more unqualified executive body?) Calling on this body, then, I want to extend Massumi's call for the creation of a cultural vocabulary of affect by tracing three lines, three key terms, of the affective body: relational intensity, the sensation of involvement, and thought-impingement. I argue that we must begin to develop a cultural-theoretical vocabulary of and for affective bodies beyond those existing vocabularies of signification. Not only can such vocabularies bring both halves of the event into focus, but this exploration also offers a material re/description of the (political) body as an effect of affect. Moreover, this reading does not apply merely to President Bush's decomposing body, but to cultural theory as such. In other words, a bodily theory of affect can become a launching pad for a more complete response to cultural-political scenes. What follows is a thus a double gesture of analysis: I want to generate an affective vocabulary via the spectacle of Bush's decomposing body, as well as a reading of this body across our developing vocabulary of affect. I suggest that such vocabularies can only be generated in a simultaneous co-emergence with(in) sites of cultural analysis. They emerge, that is, through unqualified exemplars" (p. 6).
I feel that this proposal comes from a position that relies far to heavily on an inaccurate understanding of the American public. The complex nature of this proposal incorporates elements of explanation and resolution that is rooted in a higher level of thinking that cannot be understood or utilized by the masses. This also seems to be logic which, in my opinion, complicates the understanding of Bush's bizarrely successful embrace of the role of "the village idiot." Is it that Rice wants to understand the issue at hands in terms only accessible to the intellectual elite? I fail to see the value of the "creation of a cultural vocabulary" as anything more than a means of unnecessary description. A good analogy for this would be the technology divide that exists between the rich and the poor. Society has a incredibly uneven distribution of access to new technologies. I feel that there is a simliar problem associated with education, and there would be a similar problem with Rice's "cultural vocabulary." It would not be something that most people would be able to relate to or understand, most American's already have a poor vocabulary already.
Friday, May 6, 2011
Wednesday, May 4, 2011
Nussbaum
Emotions are internal by nature but are experienced because of our relationship with external contingencies. The emotions we feel come from the ability to relate; to impose situations onto ourselves. Aristotle describes love as the acknowledgement of one’s own faults and finding compliments to these in other people. He describes fear and pity as “acknowledging our vulnerability…only if we really do think that life can do something us, and that this something matters (pg. 312).” Before one can take action, whether it is to start a fight or to fall in love, one must be able to acknowledge his/her own vulnerabilities. A somewhat cliché, yet easily graspable, example would be the concept of donation. In order for a passerby to feel compelled to give a homeless man on the street a dollar, the giver must acknowledge that the homeless man’s plight is something that could in fact happen to his/her own life. If the passerby does not recognize this as a possibility, he/she will not feel inclined to assist.
However, there are many negative consequences to this interconnectedness that drives emotion. We impose others’ circumstances onto ourselves, driving our sense of fear, hate, love, ect. In doing this we inevitably, and often, take action based on completely external possibilities. Certainly this can be seen as a potentially dangerous scenario. This leads into Plato’s idea that “a good person is completely sufficient to himself for good living (pg. 313).” In Plato’s Republic he describes a world where people do not sacrifice virtue for any reason. If people enforced this belief, emotions would virtually disappear. He makes the point that in order to be a truly virtuous human being, one must not be manipulated by emotions; of course to not be manipulated by them would mean they must somehow not exist. In order for emotions to not exist, since we have identified them as being products of outside forces, the virtuous man must recognize that “nothing among human things is worth much seriousness (pg. 313).” Only then would people be able to act solely for themselves, free from the affect of others. It is worth noting that if this were the case, our beliefs about love would, too, be shattered as love is an incredible attachment to another being, leaving people vulnerable to all sorts of actions and emotions.
Fusing both Socrates’ and Plato’s examples, emotions can be deemed as rational in the context that we are inevitably connected to other people, though they seem almost irrational for this same reason. We will be driven by the affect of outside forces but is this really necessary? Would individuals and society both be better off by a lack of emotional response or would it suffer from the consequential lack of interconnectedness?
Though I sense the allure of shrugging off circumstances I cannot control with little affect on my emotional state, I personally fall more on the side of Socrates. I find an importance to recognizing the greatness that can come from being affected by other, especially in the vein of pity and love. Though many horrific acts (war, murder, genocide, revenge) can come from this affect, so too can many acts of greatness (meaningful relationships, charity, relief, civil rights). In my personal life I’d like to find a balance between the two philosophies. Ideally, I would like to acknowledge the power of other’s on my emotions so that I can logically sift through them, deciding when it is acceptable to act on this affect and when to simply walk away from negativity. Being aware of Socrates’ observation, and keeping Plato’s solution in mind, I feel it is possible to, not control my emotions but, have the ability to understand their origins and in turn act only as I would logically want to act under my own definition of personal “virtue”.
However, there are many negative consequences to this interconnectedness that drives emotion. We impose others’ circumstances onto ourselves, driving our sense of fear, hate, love, ect. In doing this we inevitably, and often, take action based on completely external possibilities. Certainly this can be seen as a potentially dangerous scenario. This leads into Plato’s idea that “a good person is completely sufficient to himself for good living (pg. 313).” In Plato’s Republic he describes a world where people do not sacrifice virtue for any reason. If people enforced this belief, emotions would virtually disappear. He makes the point that in order to be a truly virtuous human being, one must not be manipulated by emotions; of course to not be manipulated by them would mean they must somehow not exist. In order for emotions to not exist, since we have identified them as being products of outside forces, the virtuous man must recognize that “nothing among human things is worth much seriousness (pg. 313).” Only then would people be able to act solely for themselves, free from the affect of others. It is worth noting that if this were the case, our beliefs about love would, too, be shattered as love is an incredible attachment to another being, leaving people vulnerable to all sorts of actions and emotions.
Fusing both Socrates’ and Plato’s examples, emotions can be deemed as rational in the context that we are inevitably connected to other people, though they seem almost irrational for this same reason. We will be driven by the affect of outside forces but is this really necessary? Would individuals and society both be better off by a lack of emotional response or would it suffer from the consequential lack of interconnectedness?
Though I sense the allure of shrugging off circumstances I cannot control with little affect on my emotional state, I personally fall more on the side of Socrates. I find an importance to recognizing the greatness that can come from being affected by other, especially in the vein of pity and love. Though many horrific acts (war, murder, genocide, revenge) can come from this affect, so too can many acts of greatness (meaningful relationships, charity, relief, civil rights). In my personal life I’d like to find a balance between the two philosophies. Ideally, I would like to acknowledge the power of other’s on my emotions so that I can logically sift through them, deciding when it is acceptable to act on this affect and when to simply walk away from negativity. Being aware of Socrates’ observation, and keeping Plato’s solution in mind, I feel it is possible to, not control my emotions but, have the ability to understand their origins and in turn act only as I would logically want to act under my own definition of personal “virtue”.
Ahmed - Affective Economies
Ahmed argues that emotions are not simply generated from within, but that they gain power from the interaction and connectedness of people. She even deems this circulation of emotions a functioning economy where emotions are not just experienced, but that they are constantly being exchanged between people. Ahmed heavily builds her argument on how emotions affect people by blurring the lines between hate and love. People do not form ideas like prejudices and extreme political opinions simply from an irrational hatred toward foreign people or concepts but instead because people love, and fear losing, what they personally have. To use her example of the white working man who “hates” the Mexican immigrant, he only appears to hate because he loves his home, his family, his well-being and sees the immigrant as a threat to the very foundation of all of this- his job. It is this love for his life, and the fear of losing what he loves, from which the negative behavior spawns.
Much of emotion is based on theoretical, or perceived, circumstances. The white man feels a connection with being white. He associates certain things with being white and he loves these things as they are a part of him; thus white becomes his imagined community. “The passion of these negative attachments to others is redefined simultaneously as a positive attachment to the imagined subjects brought together through the repetition of the signifier, ‘white.’ It is the shared ‘communal’ visceral response of hate. Together we hate, and this hate is what makes us together (pg. 118).” This community is, as she states, a fantasy; it is merely imagined. But the imagination can be powerful, especially when it concerns one’s personal well-being, and certainly powerful enough to generate hatred. People are connected with their fantastical communities as well as their fellow human beings. Thus it is only logical that if a person feels a threat to one of his/her communities that he/she will find another being or community to blame. Ahmed sums this up with “The bodies of others are transformed into the ‘hated’ through a discourse of pain. They are assumed to ‘cause’ injury to the ordinary white subject, such that their proximity is read as the origin of bad feeling: indeed, the implication here is that the white subject’s good feelings (love, care, loyalty) are being ‘taken’ away by the abuse of such feelings by others.” She suggests that emotions are an economy because they do not just affect individuals, they actually bind people and drive interactions.
Taking this idea to its logical conclusion, people can easily be manipulated by playing on their idea of love. If someone can make you believe you can lose what you love, they can make you believe that you hate. The very nature of her “economic” argument suggest that people are innately susceptible to forming opinions or taking action based on how others affect them, even if the affect is only just perceived.
A relevant example of this power is the modern war on terrorism. I do not aim to impose any personal opinions on the matter but, instead, apply Ahmed’s perspective. With this I consider how much of the average American’s alliance with this “war” comes simply from inflamed hatred caused by the perceived fear of losing things they love. As I see it, this idea can be applied on two important levels. One: average Americans align themselves with being American. If terrorists can be made into a threat to American ideals (freedom, liberty, happiness) they can become hated. Two: average Americans love their own life as well as the lives of those close to them. If terrorists can be seen as having the potential to end any of these lives, they can be hated. These two concepts allow for the “war on terror” to exist with support. Whether or not these terrorists will actually do real damage to either of these associations is irrelevant, the perceived threat is enough to cause hate and war.
The war on terror also ties into Ahmed’s idea of community. In order for there to be war, sides must be established. These sides become theoretical communities. In order to make them an enemy, terrorists must be definable, sharing common traits and ideas. Likewise, in order to be the “good guys”, Americans must define themselves as well. What is poignant about this real-life application of Ahmed’s ideas is that since community and fear is mostly perceived, people will extend their hate to anyone who carries any of the defining characteristics of this terrorist community. Being simply Muslim or middle-eastern can quickly make you categorize you as the perceived enemy. Questioning the war or America’s actions, can also label you as the enemy. Though Ahmed articulates that forming communities and exchanging emotions with others is inevitable, I believe the potential to manipulate love into hatred can turn into a slippery slope of over-generalization, irrelevant communities, and an abundance of hate.
Massumi
I had a hard time finding any profound meaning in Massumi's example, which is heavily relied on to support his claim, about the snowman video. It seemed to me that he was essentially elongating and complicating the reason why it is taboo to ruin the end of a movie for someone who has yet to see the film for themselves. He describes the study done with the snowman video and that asserts the following claim:
"...it may be noted that the primacy of the affective is marked by a gap between content and effect: it would appear that the strength or duration of an image's effect is not logically connected to the content in any straightforward way" (p. 24).
It seems a bit unfounded to make this claim based on the study that he presented. The affective nature of children can not, in my opinion, be used as legitimate evidence to substantiate the aforementioned claim. While I do not disagree with what he is saying, I disagree with the the study cited as a proof. However, I can identify personally with "'sad' scenes" being "rated the most pleasant" (p. 23). I find that when I watch a film or read a book, I remember most those which make me feel something. While, for me, this does not HAVE to be something that would be considered "sad," intense emotions, no matter what type of emotion they may be, resonate within me and are remembered for longer durations of time. I have always defined my affinity toward any particular form of entertainment by its ability to provoke any strong emotion or feeling within me. For me, the ability of something to provoke an intense, particular sensation is the essence of art. When a distinct sensation is evoked within me I am able to relish in how I am able to identify with the art and not only remember it, but take something away from it as well. He states that "matter-of-factness dampens intensity" (p. 25). This does not strike me as something particularly interesting or noteworthy. It seems obvious that when the imagination is allowed to operate freely, any form of entertainment is more likely to evoke a stronger emotional response. This is in essence the reason why we tend to enjoy surprise endings.
I also find his reasoning for causality unfounded. It seems to me, and this is why I do not consider children sufficient test subjects, that the "primacy of the affective" would vary on an individual basis. This is not to say that people do not operate and react in similar fashions, but rather that there are more profound implications of affect when studying individuals with more refined tastes. There is a reason that Hollywood is able to churn out profit making blockbusters, and that would be the aforementioned tendency for the masses to respond in generally similar ways. Thus, his study of children could be applied to "the masses," but could not serve as a basis to describe the "primacy of affect" beyond individuals that identify with the majority. For the rhetor, this study has profound implications yet doesn't appear to be anything that isn't already known. In my mind the conformity of mass opinion is created by the institutions that stand to profit from mass consumption (a relevant example being media conglomerates). Profits are always greater when a large number of people partake in the same activity. When we look at the radio, television, and film industry we find a small number of corporations controlling almost all of the content. Massumi's point becomes something that is already well known, as well as something that is socially constructed. When people rely upon institutions that stand to gain the most from homogenized tastes and opinions the variety of art, and peoples exposure to anything outside of the institutions interests, becomes marginalized. There is a trend of homogeneous taste and response because exposure has become homogenized as a result of the control exerted upon the means of delivering content. As stated before, this is meaningful for the rhetor. However, this is one of my fundamental issues with the way in which rhetoric attempts to understand human beings, and in turn what makes Massumi's point irrelevant to my interests.
I propose that rhetoric attempt to study human beings on hypothetical grounds; a study which embraces progressive measures to deter conformity and as a result foster creativity and originality. These grounds would extend beyond the capacity to predict and manipulate the current socially constructed mentality of the masses that allows for rhetoric, and Massumi's argument, to exists as they do.
"...it may be noted that the primacy of the affective is marked by a gap between content and effect: it would appear that the strength or duration of an image's effect is not logically connected to the content in any straightforward way" (p. 24).
It seems a bit unfounded to make this claim based on the study that he presented. The affective nature of children can not, in my opinion, be used as legitimate evidence to substantiate the aforementioned claim. While I do not disagree with what he is saying, I disagree with the the study cited as a proof. However, I can identify personally with "'sad' scenes" being "rated the most pleasant" (p. 23). I find that when I watch a film or read a book, I remember most those which make me feel something. While, for me, this does not HAVE to be something that would be considered "sad," intense emotions, no matter what type of emotion they may be, resonate within me and are remembered for longer durations of time. I have always defined my affinity toward any particular form of entertainment by its ability to provoke any strong emotion or feeling within me. For me, the ability of something to provoke an intense, particular sensation is the essence of art. When a distinct sensation is evoked within me I am able to relish in how I am able to identify with the art and not only remember it, but take something away from it as well. He states that "matter-of-factness dampens intensity" (p. 25). This does not strike me as something particularly interesting or noteworthy. It seems obvious that when the imagination is allowed to operate freely, any form of entertainment is more likely to evoke a stronger emotional response. This is in essence the reason why we tend to enjoy surprise endings.
I also find his reasoning for causality unfounded. It seems to me, and this is why I do not consider children sufficient test subjects, that the "primacy of the affective" would vary on an individual basis. This is not to say that people do not operate and react in similar fashions, but rather that there are more profound implications of affect when studying individuals with more refined tastes. There is a reason that Hollywood is able to churn out profit making blockbusters, and that would be the aforementioned tendency for the masses to respond in generally similar ways. Thus, his study of children could be applied to "the masses," but could not serve as a basis to describe the "primacy of affect" beyond individuals that identify with the majority. For the rhetor, this study has profound implications yet doesn't appear to be anything that isn't already known. In my mind the conformity of mass opinion is created by the institutions that stand to profit from mass consumption (a relevant example being media conglomerates). Profits are always greater when a large number of people partake in the same activity. When we look at the radio, television, and film industry we find a small number of corporations controlling almost all of the content. Massumi's point becomes something that is already well known, as well as something that is socially constructed. When people rely upon institutions that stand to gain the most from homogenized tastes and opinions the variety of art, and peoples exposure to anything outside of the institutions interests, becomes marginalized. There is a trend of homogeneous taste and response because exposure has become homogenized as a result of the control exerted upon the means of delivering content. As stated before, this is meaningful for the rhetor. However, this is one of my fundamental issues with the way in which rhetoric attempts to understand human beings, and in turn what makes Massumi's point irrelevant to my interests.
I propose that rhetoric attempt to study human beings on hypothetical grounds; a study which embraces progressive measures to deter conformity and as a result foster creativity and originality. These grounds would extend beyond the capacity to predict and manipulate the current socially constructed mentality of the masses that allows for rhetoric, and Massumi's argument, to exists as they do.
Brennan Ch. 5-7
"In positing that people in the Western world were once aware of the transmission of affect, and that we have been sealed against this knowledge by the deadening, passifying affects of modern times, I have implied that knowledge of transmission was once conscious, although that knowledge is now repressed. Accordingly, the problem of how we discern becomes more acute in modern context" (p. 117).
While I do not agree with Brennan's "discernment" process, I do find a lot of truth in her description of the Western world becoming "sealed against this knowledge" of affect. It seems that as people have moved toward ideologies which advocate the progress of the individual by the individual. This mentality is, in large, what creates a resistance to ideas such as affect. People experience a detachment from concepts of human connectedness when society functions in a manner that resists unity and advocates individualism. It becomes difficult to advocate the advancement of the individual by the individual when ideas such as a affect suggest a connectedness that goes so far beyond any one individual.
"By examining the affects experienced in judging another, one learns a great deal about how the illusion of self-containment is purchased at the price of dumping negative affects on that other. The dyadic and complex level of affective transmission is marked in terms of how it is that one part carries the other's negative affects; his aggression is experienced as her anxiety and so forth. By means of this projection, on believes oneself detached from him or her, when one is, in fact, propelling forward an affect that he will experience as rejection or hurt, unless he has shielded himself against these affects by similar negative propulsion, a passionate judgment of his own" (p. 119)
I find this description of projection to be an accurate explanation of the consequences associated with the misinterpretation of affect, specifically in instances characterized by the emphasis put on individualism by the Western world. Brennan argues that by resisting affect in the wrong way (essentially not understanding, acknowledging, or accepting it) one begins to project negative affects outward. When one is only capable of understanding one's self as a contained unit, one becomes susceptible to projection of the negative. If the individual is able to realize itself as part of a much larger system of connectedness, he or she is able to utilize affect in a positive way. Put differently, rather associating negative affects with others one is able to identify with their own particular sense of self at a particular moment. This is something that is far more manageable. If one is able to stop blaming others for their own particular demeanor they can prevent negativity in the future. So long as affect is harbored via projection, progress within one's self becomes impossible. This is because the individual is not able to completely control, explain, or fully understand what someone else is experiencing. It becomes necessary to accept affect, in part, as something that you are experiencing. It is also necessary to disassociate the cause of affect from the individuals around you. Individual progress is heavily dependent upon correctly interpreting, understanding, and controlling affect.
While I do not agree with Brennan's "discernment" process, I do find a lot of truth in her description of the Western world becoming "sealed against this knowledge" of affect. It seems that as people have moved toward ideologies which advocate the progress of the individual by the individual. This mentality is, in large, what creates a resistance to ideas such as affect. People experience a detachment from concepts of human connectedness when society functions in a manner that resists unity and advocates individualism. It becomes difficult to advocate the advancement of the individual by the individual when ideas such as a affect suggest a connectedness that goes so far beyond any one individual.
"By examining the affects experienced in judging another, one learns a great deal about how the illusion of self-containment is purchased at the price of dumping negative affects on that other. The dyadic and complex level of affective transmission is marked in terms of how it is that one part carries the other's negative affects; his aggression is experienced as her anxiety and so forth. By means of this projection, on believes oneself detached from him or her, when one is, in fact, propelling forward an affect that he will experience as rejection or hurt, unless he has shielded himself against these affects by similar negative propulsion, a passionate judgment of his own" (p. 119)
I find this description of projection to be an accurate explanation of the consequences associated with the misinterpretation of affect, specifically in instances characterized by the emphasis put on individualism by the Western world. Brennan argues that by resisting affect in the wrong way (essentially not understanding, acknowledging, or accepting it) one begins to project negative affects outward. When one is only capable of understanding one's self as a contained unit, one becomes susceptible to projection of the negative. If the individual is able to realize itself as part of a much larger system of connectedness, he or she is able to utilize affect in a positive way. Put differently, rather associating negative affects with others one is able to identify with their own particular sense of self at a particular moment. This is something that is far more manageable. If one is able to stop blaming others for their own particular demeanor they can prevent negativity in the future. So long as affect is harbored via projection, progress within one's self becomes impossible. This is because the individual is not able to completely control, explain, or fully understand what someone else is experiencing. It becomes necessary to accept affect, in part, as something that you are experiencing. It is also necessary to disassociate the cause of affect from the individuals around you. Individual progress is heavily dependent upon correctly interpreting, understanding, and controlling affect.
Brennan Ch. 3 - 4 - Crowds Are Composed of Mad Individuals
I found a particular segment of Brennan's description of "Transmission in Groups" particularly interesting.
"Floyd Allport was the first to reject Le Bon's and McDougall's 'group fallacy' or 'the error of substituting the group as a whole as a principle of explanation.' Only individuals, Allport believed (as did others) have minds. Nonetheless, these individuals are predisposed in similar ways to satisfy their basic drives. Crowds sometimes offer them an opportunity to find this satisfaction: 'The menacing and the drives of a large number of individuals simultaneously both draws them together and incites them to common action.' 'The individual sees with his own eyes that others are delivering the blow he longs to deliver, and are thereby expressing, not disapproval of acts of violence, but the strongest kind of approval.' Critically, the crowd adds nothing new to what the individual would do if her were by himself. The individual 'behaves just as he would behave alone, only more so.' He behaves 'more so' because 'the sights and sounds facilitate an increased fervor in the responses of each'" (p. 59-60).
I find this notion of crowd behavior particularly interesting when I think about the two distinct ways in which I experience affect in groups. The first way is in a situation which inherently makes me uncomfortable, a good example being the nature of the crowd at UT Football game. I quote by singer/songwriter Julian Casablancas effectively sums up my sentiments toward the competitive nature of the crowd at a football game, it reads as follows:
"Where cities come together to hate each other in the name of sport, America"
I often feel that the aggression associated with sports is unnecessary. Of the few football games I have attended, I rarely saw legitimate competition with UT's highly talented team. It often seems as though there are a large number of UT fans shouting rather derogatory and hateful chants at the other team, even though there are very few fans supporting the other team. It is clear to me that the other school does not take football nearly as seriously, and thus the thousands of UT fans shouting "make 'em eat shit" makes me uncomfortable.
My initial reaction the excerpt from "The Transmission of Affect" was that it was inaccurate, because in these situations I often find myself reacting in a hypersensitive nature opposite to that of the rest of the crowd. However, after thinking about it more it rings true that "The individual 'behaves just as he would behave alone, only more so.'" I feel uncomfortable toward the crowd mentality associated with sporting events when I simply think about everything that goes into the crowds mentality and behavior. Therefore, actually being at the sporting event the way I would be have alone becomes increased quite a bit. I experience the affective nature of the crowd and become increasingly introverted toward the crowd mentality.
The second way is a situation in which I have preconceived notions about enjoying the affect of the crowd. A good example of this would be a concert that I have sought out and have excitement about attending. I do not find myself at all uncomfortable or in opposition with the crowds affect. I embrace it, and the way in which I think about how I would like to be when listening to whatever music becomes heightened. Put differently, I feel more capable of dancing or singing along that I might if I were along or with a small group of friends.
I find the idea of expectations and opinions about the crowd mentality to be an interesting component of transmission in groups. This expands upon thoughts I have about the extent to which affect can effect the individual based on the particular way in which the individual orients him/herself respective to the crowd. This also supports Brennan's notion that affect can be controlled, in the instance of transmission in crowds it seems that affect is "controlled" without any conscious effort being exerted upon it. However, since this is an unconscious interpretation of the affect, it is not a proper form of control. The affect is still consuming the individual, even if the individual is not responding in accordance with the rest of the crowd. So affect is thwarted, not controlled.... but this supports the notion that affect is not homogeneous of forcefully encompassing, unless no effort is to taken to make it function to the contrary.
Thursday, April 28, 2011
Final Project Proposal
Overview: Form an argument which explains your understanding of affect.
Specifics:
1. Use at least 3 sources from readings that were done for class
2. Use at least 3 outside sources
3. Explain:
- What is affect
- How should it be interpreted
- What is your understanding of its significance
Final Project
Specifics:
1. Use at least 3 sources from readings that were done for class
2. Use at least 3 outside sources
3. Explain:
- What is affect
- How should it be interpreted
- What is your understanding of its significance
Final Project
Monday, April 11, 2011
Brennan Ch. 1-2
“MAN IS NOT UNITY BUT MULTIPLE”
Maurice Nicoll is a British psychologist who studied under Jung, Gurdjieff, and Ouspensky. In his piece Simple Explanation of Work Ideas he inadvertently addresses the transmission of affect in a very interesting way. Nicoll discusses the process necessary for one to truly understand one’s self. The point of intrigue, for me, is that he appears to argue that the transmission of affect, as described by Brennan, must be disregarded in order to truly be in touch with one’s self. A significant component to reaching a higher state of consciousness, according to Nicoll, is in direct contrast with Brennan’s notion of the transmission of effect.
Nicoll acknowledges the transmission of affect in his own way. He says, “When we begin to realize that things speak out of us and actions take place from us without our consciousness, we begin to get a new view of ourselves” (Nicoll: A Simple Explanation of Work Ideas p. 18). He agrees with Brennan that there are, in a sense, intangible influences which can cause us to be a certain way. He also addresses the affect others can have on the individual with their presence alone. He says “Notice the ‘I’s you are in when you are alone: notice how they change when anyone comes into the room. Try to notice the intonation with which different ‘I’s speak” (Nicoll: A Simple Explanation of Work Ideas p. 32).
Nicoll and Brennan begin to disagree on their interpretations of the significance and nature of the transmission of effect. Brennan appears to take the stance that the individual is, to an extent, one with its environment. She says, “All this means, indeed the transmission of affect means, that we are not self-contained in terms of our energies. There is no secure distinction between the ‘individual’ and the ‘environment.’ (Brennan p. 6). Nicoll argues that this type of association is the source of unhappiness and dissatisfaction for human beings. He says, “It is usual to see all our difficulties as being due to causes outside ourselves, because this is all we do see. But if we begin to realise that it is ourselves, our level of being, that attracts our life, and understand the necessity of working on ourselves because our problem lies in ourselves, we can begin to change” (Nicoll: A Simple Explanation of Work Ideas p. 33).
I begin to question the entirety of Brennan’s argument through her direct agreement with Nicoll. Brennan states, “At the personal level, the transmission of these affects can be resisted, provided they are discerned…” (Brennan p. 23) I feel that the foundation for an existence of the transmission of effect, in some form, has been legitimately established. It is the the direct contradiction between Brannan and Nicoll’s rationalizations of the importance of effect that, for me, leads her argument astray. She says, “These affects come from the other, but we deny them. Or they come from us, but we pretend (habitually) that they come from the other. Envy, anger, aggression behavior—these are the problems of the other. Overtolerance, overgenerosity—these are our problems” (Brennan p. 13). She discusses negative affects and the internalization of affects as defense mechanisms. Put differently, misinterpretation of affect becomes a way to avoid accepting one’s own undesirable characteristics or negative emotions; affect becomes a way to project the negative onto others, and to embrace the overly positive as one’s own burden.
This is where, for me, Nicoll’s idea of man as multiple trumps Brennan’s logic. Nicoll argues that in order to better one’s self one must accept that states of being are in constant flux. One is never the same from one moment to the next. Thus, in order to grow, affect must be observed from outside one’s self. One then becomes capable of not identifying with negative affects. He says, “When we realise we need not go with a mood etc., but can draw the feeling of ‘I’ out of it, we begin to see what not identifying with ourselves means” (Nicoll: A Simple Explanation of Work Ideas p. 55). Brennan’s argument focuses on rationalizing the “I” in terms of convoluted interpretations of affect. She also marginalizes not identifying with one’s self as a surge in people embracing Western individuality.
Brennan states, “The reality of the increase makes the Western individual especially more concerned with securing a private fortress, personal boundaries, against the unsolicited emotional intrusions of the other” (Brennan p. 15). While I agree with the limitations of Western individuality, I feel that Brennan misses the critical component of disassociation, which in a way is Nicoll’s argument. I find far more functionality and insightfulness in Nicoll’s notion of accepting one’s own variability and observing affect from an outside perspective that naturally becomes introspective. Both Nicoll and Brennan agree on the existence of affect, but Brennan complicates the issue because she ignores the crucial role the individual plays in the extent to which affect can exist. She seems to argue an almost opposite of Nicoll’s stance. Brennan says, “It explains why we are willing to see the other as the origin of negative affects, such as envy and aggression, which we would rather disown in ourselves” (Brennan p. 14). Nicoll claims that others are the source of negative emotion for any particular individual, and by not identifying with the way these negative emotions make one feel one can find solace.
A Side note:
The nature of this material makes it difficult to form a universally coherent argument. I am sure that you would understand what I was saying better had you read Nicoll’s work yourself. The ideas discussed in both Brennan and Nicoll’s works are very abstract. I feel that the transmission affect can be better understood by looking at it from multiple perspectives. I also feel that Brennan overcomplicates the idea as a whole, and also misses a perspective that is necessary for its relevant exploration.
Wednesday, March 30, 2011
Visual Argument
Fast food has rapidly become an industry which increasingly extensive negative effects on the environment and society’s health. People often ignore, or are unaware, of these effects when they purchase fast food items. This visual argument is an attempt to point out the vast growth and increased consumption of fast food, and the residual effects on the environment and consumer health.
The first image conjures up feelings of nostalgia, if the viewer was alive when McDonalds was founded, or, if they weren’t alive, a sense of wonder about a time they have only heard or read about. This image uses presuppositions about the audience’s knowledge of McDonalds’ (and fast food in general) successful transformation from a small burger stand to a multinational corporation. In context this image also brings up ideas about capitalism as an American ideal. By any measure, McDonald’s is a capitalistic success story. The second image shows a stereotypical farm with cows happily grazing. This associates the old McDonalds with a small farm environment. This creates a relationship between the beginnings of fast food development, a staple in American cuisine, and a pleasant farm environment. The viewer is given a brief reminder of a time when an industry that is so prevalent today was very different. The farm also makes a positive association with the product it is producing, something that is familiar and known as a cornerstone in the human race’s industrialization and growth.
The next picture is a busy McDonalds in what looks like another country. This makes the viewer see the transition and the growth and development of a particular player in a much larger industry. They are reminded of the frequency people consume fast food, and the global level on which the industry operates. This makes the viewer feel familiarity in the now, it also makes them feel the shift the industry has taken in a terms of presentation and prevalence. This image relies on presuppositions about the overconsumption of fast food, yet introduces it in a subtle way. It functions on a surface level, mostly inspiring a feeling of change in general. The next picture is of a sandwich from KFC which uses two pieces of fried chicken rather than buns. This is a somewhat comical use of the presupposition that certain components of the fast food industry have gone too far. This sandwich is the epitome of excess and makes the viewer feel somewhat disgusted. The viewer will feel guilt if this is a food item they eat themselves. They may also feel anger about others consuming food that is so clearly a poor dietary choice.
The fifth image is of a large feedlot. This pulls the viewer into a much harsher component of the industry, and again points to the change in the way the industry functions. The image itself makes the viewer feel dirty and wary. If the viewer has ever been near a feedlot they will be reminded of the putrid smell of feces and filth the environment creates. The viewer will feel a sense of pity for the animals awful living conditions. Again, they will feel more guilt or anger depending on the role they play in supporting the fast food industry. The viewer may also be grossed out by the food they have consumed in the past given the conditions the ingredients are raised in. The sixth image is of several obese children eating at a McDonalds. This brings the viewer back to something that they are familiar with, whether it be because they see obese children or because they themselves are obese. This makes the viewer feel an even greater sense of guilt and anger, and at this point should have them questioning their consumption of fast food. They should also be questioning the necessity and general nature of the fast food industry. These children represent a presupposition about America’s growing reputation as a fat unhealthy country that lives off of fast food. The viewer is again reminded of overconsumption and excess of the industry as a whole.
The seventh image is of McDonalds’ executives at a press conference. This gives a face to the industry, and brings in the business elements (a pursuit of profits) that perpetuate the consumption and low prices of the food. The viewer feels a sense of anger toward the stereotypical white males who run the McDonalds Corporation. Presuppositions about corruption and the elite class exploiting the common man are utilized in this photo. The viewer may be made to feel as though they have been wronged and, if they consume fast food, a desire to stop supporting the industry. The eighth picture is of two hands shaking with foreign currency turning into a gooey mess in their hands. The background shows industrial images of smoke stacks on the top and a clean image depicting industry on the bottom. This utilizes the presuppositions from the previous image to solidify the idea of the industry and the government being in cahoots. This furthers the anger and paints the fast food industry in a very malicious and negative light. The viewer can’t help but draw associations between the changes in the industry and the involvement of the industry in the government. It also makes the viewer consider why something that is clearly so damaging for society and the environment is able to continue thriving.
The ninth picture is a kid eating a burger with a McDonalds’ logo in the background. This is an interesting picture. The ketchup surrounding the kid’s mouth resembles blood and creates a very dark, almost evil, feeling about the act of actually eating fast food. This brings the viewer back to something very familiar. The kid in the picture is nondescript and could easily be the viewer or someone the viewer knows. The bright blue sky in the background is contrasted with the gross image of the kid eating the burger. This brings the viewer back to feeling disgust, and makes them consider the other images and the functionality of the industry as a whole. The have been brought through various processes and ideologies about the industry and are then presented with an image they can relate to of someone simply eating a burger. The preceding eight images set up the ninth up to really shine. The other images really bring out the dark and grotesque nature of the ninth.
Photographs:
Sunday, March 6, 2011
Kennedy
This piece did not resonate with me because I felt that it forcefully incorporated rhetoric as a function of it's argument. What I interpreted to be the point of this piece, and what I feel Kennedy says quite explicitly, is that by studying behavioral and communicative characteristics of animals the evolution and development of rhetoric can be better understood. I can presumably follow that argument, and can also see potential for it having intriguing characteristics; however, I find myself a bit unclear on how this is an expansion of what we already know about rhetoric. Kennedy states "This brief discussion is intended to direct attention to animal communication as a way of understanding some basic features of rhetoric that might be restated as general rules" (p.20). I fail to see where he outlines anything that isn't logical, and in terms of rhetoric (which I personally feel is a subject that often over extends its boundaries and application) is imaginative or insightful. The general consensus that I came to roughly halfway through this piece was that Kennedy was effectively forming a logical manipulation of the principles of rhetoric in order to apply them to the behavioral and communicative characteristics of animals. I feel that this quote was almost an admittance of my accusation:
"Using the traditional parts of rhetoric as a basis for discussion may be objected to by some as analogous to ethnocentrism in anthropology, the imposition of a later, and Western, structural scheme on phenomena that in their natural state might be related in different ways. My response to this criticism is to agree that the categories of traditional rhetoric may not be a satisfactory basis to describe animal communication and I do not use them for that purpose. What I am looking for are features of animal communication that resemble categories of traditional rhetoric and that therefore suggest that these categories, though conditioned by cultural conventions, represent the survival of certain natural phenomenon" (p. 14).
I find the notion of "the survival of natural phenomenon" interesting on its own, but after reading this piece I did not feel like the imposition of rhetoric as an explanatory characteristic gave me greater insight on this topic. Kennedy presents some conceptually sound arguments which link rhetoric to animal life, yet in my opinion fails to develop anything more than that. He has managed to fit rhetoric into a mold, yet has failed to give it any meaning. Just because you can formulate a relationship between subjects does not mean that the relationship has anything to offer in terms of expanding an understanding of the subjects being related. Part of me feels that there is something to be said about examining the evolution of rhetoric in terms of survival strategies, yet I felt the approach taken by Kennedy was an effort to (in my opinion unnecessarily) give rhetoric an artificially higher calling.
This manifests itself most obviously in some of Kennedy's language choices. I found some of his arguments to be suggestive, rather than actually founded. I question his fourth thesis which claimed "The function of rhetoric is the survival of the fittest." Does he mean "A function of rhetoric"? I also question his logic here:
"...the claim of Aristotle (Rhetoric 1.1.14) and his successors that the function of rhetoric is not persuasion but observing the available means of persuasion. A speech may not succeed, but in Aristotle's view may still be the best possible speech and demonstrate the speaker's rhetorical skill. Of course a speech, though ineffective with an audience, may successfully fulfill the speaker's need to speak--to put himself 'on record' as it were; a bird that gives a cry indicating a predator fulfills a need to express that, even if the bird is mistaken or ignored by others. A speech that is not successful at the moment may affect future conditions indirectly" (p. 8).
I understand the connection... A human speaker has a need to speak as he feels his words hold a meaning that must be said, and a bird fears a predator and feels the need to indicate danger; despite the success of either "speaker," their motivation is in a similar vein? I just feel that if I break down this excerpt all he is really doing is establishing his ethos as a rhetorical authority and then loosely incorporating a hypothetical situation involving a bird's instinctual fear of a predator as some sort of relevant rhetorical function. It seems that rhetoric's relevance in this logic is suggested more than substantiated, and contrived rather than necessarily insightful.
This quote is in my opinion very indicative of Kennedy's attempt to stretch rhetoric's application in what seems to me a bizarre attempt to glorify its importance:
"In theory, one might even seek to identify some quantitative unit of rhetorical energy--call it the "rheme"--analogous to an erg or volt, by which rhetorical energy could be measured. I leave that to the experimentalist" (p. 2)
Is this not a rather desperate attempt to link rhetoric and science in a completely unjustifiable way? I found his qualifier ("I leave that to the experimentalist") particularly hilarious. I guess I just don't find many profound, thoughtful implications within this piece that resonate outside of the egocentric misguided logic, and the rather suggestive language that dominates (for me) its entirety. Someone please explain the point of posing some sort of measurable rhetorical energy "rheme" as being anything other than an attempt by Kennedy to give his reasoning and profession a sort of self fulfilling pseudo-scientific application.
"Using the traditional parts of rhetoric as a basis for discussion may be objected to by some as analogous to ethnocentrism in anthropology, the imposition of a later, and Western, structural scheme on phenomena that in their natural state might be related in different ways. My response to this criticism is to agree that the categories of traditional rhetoric may not be a satisfactory basis to describe animal communication and I do not use them for that purpose. What I am looking for are features of animal communication that resemble categories of traditional rhetoric and that therefore suggest that these categories, though conditioned by cultural conventions, represent the survival of certain natural phenomenon" (p. 14).
I find the notion of "the survival of natural phenomenon" interesting on its own, but after reading this piece I did not feel like the imposition of rhetoric as an explanatory characteristic gave me greater insight on this topic. Kennedy presents some conceptually sound arguments which link rhetoric to animal life, yet in my opinion fails to develop anything more than that. He has managed to fit rhetoric into a mold, yet has failed to give it any meaning. Just because you can formulate a relationship between subjects does not mean that the relationship has anything to offer in terms of expanding an understanding of the subjects being related. Part of me feels that there is something to be said about examining the evolution of rhetoric in terms of survival strategies, yet I felt the approach taken by Kennedy was an effort to (in my opinion unnecessarily) give rhetoric an artificially higher calling.
This manifests itself most obviously in some of Kennedy's language choices. I found some of his arguments to be suggestive, rather than actually founded. I question his fourth thesis which claimed "The function of rhetoric is the survival of the fittest." Does he mean "A function of rhetoric"? I also question his logic here:
"...the claim of Aristotle (Rhetoric 1.1.14) and his successors that the function of rhetoric is not persuasion but observing the available means of persuasion. A speech may not succeed, but in Aristotle's view may still be the best possible speech and demonstrate the speaker's rhetorical skill. Of course a speech, though ineffective with an audience, may successfully fulfill the speaker's need to speak--to put himself 'on record' as it were; a bird that gives a cry indicating a predator fulfills a need to express that, even if the bird is mistaken or ignored by others. A speech that is not successful at the moment may affect future conditions indirectly" (p. 8).
I understand the connection... A human speaker has a need to speak as he feels his words hold a meaning that must be said, and a bird fears a predator and feels the need to indicate danger; despite the success of either "speaker," their motivation is in a similar vein? I just feel that if I break down this excerpt all he is really doing is establishing his ethos as a rhetorical authority and then loosely incorporating a hypothetical situation involving a bird's instinctual fear of a predator as some sort of relevant rhetorical function. It seems that rhetoric's relevance in this logic is suggested more than substantiated, and contrived rather than necessarily insightful.
This quote is in my opinion very indicative of Kennedy's attempt to stretch rhetoric's application in what seems to me a bizarre attempt to glorify its importance:
"In theory, one might even seek to identify some quantitative unit of rhetorical energy--call it the "rheme"--analogous to an erg or volt, by which rhetorical energy could be measured. I leave that to the experimentalist" (p. 2)
Is this not a rather desperate attempt to link rhetoric and science in a completely unjustifiable way? I found his qualifier ("I leave that to the experimentalist") particularly hilarious. I guess I just don't find many profound, thoughtful implications within this piece that resonate outside of the egocentric misguided logic, and the rather suggestive language that dominates (for me) its entirety. Someone please explain the point of posing some sort of measurable rhetorical energy "rheme" as being anything other than an attempt by Kennedy to give his reasoning and profession a sort of self fulfilling pseudo-scientific application.
Damasio Ch. 1-4
I recently came across several ideas from Naomi L. Quenk's "Beside Ourselves: Our Hidden Personality in Everyday Life" which I feel pertain to, and provide insight on a lot of the material we discuss in class. Quenk's book is an interpretation and application of the work of Carl G. Jung, a Swiss psychiatrist who studied under Freud.
Excerpt from Chapter 1: Jungian Psychology and Hidden Personality: The Principle of Compensation
"Psychological opposites are essential for the whole of Jung's personality theory, just as they are for his type theory. This opposition provides a way for our psyches to correct one-sidedness. Jung called the mechanism for correcting one-sidedness compensation."
Excerpt from Appendix B: Selected Quotations From Jung on His Typology: Differentiation of Functions
"So long as a function is still fused with one or more of the other functions--thinking with feeling, feeling with sensation, etc--that it is unable to operate on its own, it is...not differentiated, not separated from the whole as a special part and existing by itself. Undifferentiated thinking is incapable of thinking apart from other functions; it is continually mixed up with sensations and fantasies... To the extent that a function is largely or wholly unconscious, it is also undifferentiated; it is not only fused together in its parts but also merged with the functions... Without differentiation direction is impossible, since the direction of a function towards a goal depends on the elimination of anything irrelevant. Fusion with the irrelevant precludes direction; only a differentiated function is capable of being directed."
These quotes create solid iteration of how I interpreted the post-accident affects of Phineas Gage and Elliot from "Descartes Error" in their abilities to perform certain functions. I remember in particular Elliot's inability to effectively sort papers etc. I feel that this quote is a good depiction of the failure of these processes: "Without differentiation direction is impossible, since the direction of a function towards a goal depends on the elimination of anything irrelevant." I find the idea of various personality characteristics struggling to work harmoniously very interesting. Jung proposes that if one characteristic becomes dominant (as often happens as Jung believes we are born with a predisposition to certain characteristic) opposite functions will suffer. He also claims that the dominant characteristic can develop into a "one-sided" form which becomes problematic for outward and inward representation and interpretation of one's dominant personality characteristics. I propose that this is somewhat explanatory of the patients described in "Descartes Error." If these patients functions (specifically emotion) became differentiated, whether it be because they were removed entirely or if they were merely separated from other functions (evidence from "Descartes Error" points to the former), the problems Jung describes as "one-sided" development would provide insight into their inability to perform certain tasks and manage certain aspects of their lives. By this logic, Elliot is unable to effectively sort a stack of papers because the unconscious function of his emotions no longer give his actions direction.
I also find it interesting that Aristotle explains emotions by forming pairs of opposites, and Jung explains the development, explanations of, and restructuring of personality in pairs of opposites as well. The pairing of Jung's explanation of personality with Aristotle's explanation of emotion is a very interesting one. Aristotle does not discuss the balancing act that occurs as a natural human process as described by Jung, but I do feel Jung's work can provide insight into the rhetorical application of Aristotle's appeal to emotion. Jung addresses the notion of projection, simply put the tendency to observe our own insecurities in other people. This can be a manifestation of characteristics we like, yet lack in our own demeanor, or dislike, yet have tendencies to have ourselves. Jung's work adds to the understanding of how emotions and personalities functions within the human psyche. I recommend researching this stuff on your own, as it is very interesting and provides a lot of insight into the material we cover in class!
Excerpt from Chapter 1: Jungian Psychology and Hidden Personality: The Principle of Compensation
"Psychological opposites are essential for the whole of Jung's personality theory, just as they are for his type theory. This opposition provides a way for our psyches to correct one-sidedness. Jung called the mechanism for correcting one-sidedness compensation."
Excerpt from Appendix B: Selected Quotations From Jung on His Typology: Differentiation of Functions
"So long as a function is still fused with one or more of the other functions--thinking with feeling, feeling with sensation, etc--that it is unable to operate on its own, it is...not differentiated, not separated from the whole as a special part and existing by itself. Undifferentiated thinking is incapable of thinking apart from other functions; it is continually mixed up with sensations and fantasies... To the extent that a function is largely or wholly unconscious, it is also undifferentiated; it is not only fused together in its parts but also merged with the functions... Without differentiation direction is impossible, since the direction of a function towards a goal depends on the elimination of anything irrelevant. Fusion with the irrelevant precludes direction; only a differentiated function is capable of being directed."
These quotes create solid iteration of how I interpreted the post-accident affects of Phineas Gage and Elliot from "Descartes Error" in their abilities to perform certain functions. I remember in particular Elliot's inability to effectively sort papers etc. I feel that this quote is a good depiction of the failure of these processes: "Without differentiation direction is impossible, since the direction of a function towards a goal depends on the elimination of anything irrelevant." I find the idea of various personality characteristics struggling to work harmoniously very interesting. Jung proposes that if one characteristic becomes dominant (as often happens as Jung believes we are born with a predisposition to certain characteristic) opposite functions will suffer. He also claims that the dominant characteristic can develop into a "one-sided" form which becomes problematic for outward and inward representation and interpretation of one's dominant personality characteristics. I propose that this is somewhat explanatory of the patients described in "Descartes Error." If these patients functions (specifically emotion) became differentiated, whether it be because they were removed entirely or if they were merely separated from other functions (evidence from "Descartes Error" points to the former), the problems Jung describes as "one-sided" development would provide insight into their inability to perform certain tasks and manage certain aspects of their lives. By this logic, Elliot is unable to effectively sort a stack of papers because the unconscious function of his emotions no longer give his actions direction.
I also find it interesting that Aristotle explains emotions by forming pairs of opposites, and Jung explains the development, explanations of, and restructuring of personality in pairs of opposites as well. The pairing of Jung's explanation of personality with Aristotle's explanation of emotion is a very interesting one. Aristotle does not discuss the balancing act that occurs as a natural human process as described by Jung, but I do feel Jung's work can provide insight into the rhetorical application of Aristotle's appeal to emotion. Jung addresses the notion of projection, simply put the tendency to observe our own insecurities in other people. This can be a manifestation of characteristics we like, yet lack in our own demeanor, or dislike, yet have tendencies to have ourselves. Jung's work adds to the understanding of how emotions and personalities functions within the human psyche. I recommend researching this stuff on your own, as it is very interesting and provides a lot of insight into the material we cover in class!
Wednesday, March 2, 2011
Written Pathetic Appeal
The purpose of my piece is to point out and intensify the insecurities of a generation. In particular, those of us who are less equipped to combat the rise in unemployment that has resulted from a global economic collapse. I am trying to point to the lack of change that has resulted in the way a system that is spiraling out of control functions. I understand that this piece may create some disdain toward me, as I am the author and the subject is a bit abrasive. I accept this as part of what I wanted to create; which was to encourage an active pursuit to deflect potential defeat, rather than a submissive acceptance of failure. I attempt to create a sense of fear, anger, and discontent that is coupled with a logical assessment of reality. I hope that this piece resonates with you enough on an emotional level to give you the inspiration to consider your life, place in the world, and future success from an alternative perspective. I am not simply trying to get a rise out of you by attacking the one definitive thing I know about most of you, your major.
Revision:
I took my argument and made every attempt I could to make it more specific. My first submission had a lot of ambiguity and left a lot of things open to interpretation. This revision is more focused on exactly what I wanted to argue, as well as more specific in terms of how to interpret what I say. I also tried to reduce interpretation in terms of what I am saying regarding liberal arts education. I also worked out several mechanical/grammatical errors and issues of word choice.
Written Pathetic Appeal
Revision:
I took my argument and made every attempt I could to make it more specific. My first submission had a lot of ambiguity and left a lot of things open to interpretation. This revision is more focused on exactly what I wanted to argue, as well as more specific in terms of how to interpret what I say. I also tried to reduce interpretation in terms of what I am saying regarding liberal arts education. I also worked out several mechanical/grammatical errors and issues of word choice.
Written Pathetic Appeal
Sunday, February 20, 2011
Smith and Hyde
Least importantly, I felt that Smith and Hyde's point could have been summed up using much less paper. The whole piece just seemed far too redundant. I often found myself questioning the relevance or the necessity of a lot of the people they referenced. However, altogether, I felt that they did a good job providing an applicable understanding of Aristotle's take on emotions.
I felt that they should have included in their conclusion, when debating potential discussion of their analysis's applicability to a modern crowd, the following point:
They discuss the fragmented media as a potential criticism from McGee and Martin. They quote McGee saying "One clear truth will not change: The publics business is now being done more often via direct mail, television spots, documentaries, mass entertainment, and 'quotable quotes' on the evening news than through the more traditional media (broadsides, pamphlets, books, and public speeches.)" They say "doesn't this phenomenon create grave difficulties for orators seeking to define and sustain audiences with public discourse?" The idea being that their point regarding the importance of emotion becomes less important when people most often receive things in a much hastier, fragmented fashion. They should have pointed out that the fragmented media creates very specific niches that allow people to reinforce, and surround themselves with, things that they are biased toward. While you may not have the opportunity to play with emotion the way Edward's did, due to time and delivery constraints, speakers have the same advantage as Edward's in that they can often know what their audience fancies. Emotion can play just as significant a role, although arguably not the EXACT same role, as it did in Edward's time. The fragmented delivery of media, I would argue, has helped to keep the importance of emotional appeals alive in this rapidly expanding world. The internet allows speakers to reach very specific, and easily categorized, groups of people who migrate towards the things they agree with, like, etc. This isn't necessarily good for the human race as a whole, as it allows people to further narrow the scope of the information they receive, but I do feel that it helps an orator target specific emotional appeals. When so many things are changing so rapidly, and people have access to such a variety of content, it can often be hard to read, or even know anything about, an audience. The world is far different, and more relevant to my point groups of people are far more expansive and diverse, than it/they were when Edward's was speaking to the masses. I would argue that as outlandish as Edward's methods may seem to a college classroom full of rhetoric students, given fragmented methods of media delivery Edward's could very likely find a group of people, in 2011, that would be affected by his sermons emotional appeals.
I felt that they should have included in their conclusion, when debating potential discussion of their analysis's applicability to a modern crowd, the following point:
They discuss the fragmented media as a potential criticism from McGee and Martin. They quote McGee saying "One clear truth will not change: The publics business is now being done more often via direct mail, television spots, documentaries, mass entertainment, and 'quotable quotes' on the evening news than through the more traditional media (broadsides, pamphlets, books, and public speeches.)" They say "doesn't this phenomenon create grave difficulties for orators seeking to define and sustain audiences with public discourse?" The idea being that their point regarding the importance of emotion becomes less important when people most often receive things in a much hastier, fragmented fashion. They should have pointed out that the fragmented media creates very specific niches that allow people to reinforce, and surround themselves with, things that they are biased toward. While you may not have the opportunity to play with emotion the way Edward's did, due to time and delivery constraints, speakers have the same advantage as Edward's in that they can often know what their audience fancies. Emotion can play just as significant a role, although arguably not the EXACT same role, as it did in Edward's time. The fragmented delivery of media, I would argue, has helped to keep the importance of emotional appeals alive in this rapidly expanding world. The internet allows speakers to reach very specific, and easily categorized, groups of people who migrate towards the things they agree with, like, etc. This isn't necessarily good for the human race as a whole, as it allows people to further narrow the scope of the information they receive, but I do feel that it helps an orator target specific emotional appeals. When so many things are changing so rapidly, and people have access to such a variety of content, it can often be hard to read, or even know anything about, an audience. The world is far different, and more relevant to my point groups of people are far more expansive and diverse, than it/they were when Edward's was speaking to the masses. I would argue that as outlandish as Edward's methods may seem to a college classroom full of rhetoric students, given fragmented methods of media delivery Edward's could very likely find a group of people, in 2011, that would be affected by his sermons emotional appeals.
Tuesday, February 8, 2011
Monday, February 7, 2011
Visual Analysis
I found this advertisement on the www.thecoolhunter.net. I am unable to find reliable information regarding the original context of the ad. I don’t really think it is of much relevance to the audience considering only a small fraction of human beings can afford the product. This seems to be, if anything, a bit of guerilla marketing. It appears to have circulated the internet, and has been associated with "ad-wars" between BMW and Audi. This was proposed as an "end of discussion" from Bentley to the bickering companies. However, there is not solid evidence that this is the case.
The argument the image is making is that Bentley has the status and the product to literally tell the competition to f*** off. Also owning a Bentley puts you in a position to tell everyone who doesn’t to f*** off as well. This works in multiple directions. It makes those who are not owners envious, and it makes potential owners smitten about entering into the ranks of Bentley owners. The man in the picture exudes a smug, confident sense of pride.
The ad makes fun of itself, as well as its competition, and manages to do it with class. Very few companies could pull something like this off; Bentley has a reputation for producing some of the most luxurious and expensive cars in the world. The image of the car and the brand is depicted blatantly by the cliche luxury environment created in the room. Considering the niche market the company serves (the extremely wealthy) the ad is speaking to the mentality of status symbols we typically keep to ourselves. Everything we buy is, in one way or another, a representation of the image associated with the brand.
“I drive a Bentley-- I am better than you.”
This is essentially the gist. A simple concept that is at the root of most advertisements, but can hardly ever be said out loud without seeming pretentious. The type of person likely to respond to this would be someone who was not easily offended, and someone who doesn’t mind laughing about their elite status. This appeals to literally the person it depicts. Bentley is saying : yes you are a rich, white, elitist male, and you have every right to give everyone else the finger. You, and your car, rule. This is not to say that being a white male is essential, it just appeals to a pseudo-ideal. The stereotype shown can be applied more to a mentality rather than literally a type of person.
The subject is surrounded by shiny leather and a dark ominous background, which leaves the rest of the room up to the viewers imagination. It is hard to envision a place where a man in a nice suit comfortably rests on a fancy leather couch as being anything other than grand. This creates the exclusive nature of wealth itself and appeals to most peoples desire to be a member of the (fiscally speaking) elite. By keeping the contents of the image simple and vague, the viewer can feel more of the room itself. The sheen coming from the leather couch gives the audience a sense of the familiar, cold touch of leather. Requiring the audience to utilize their imaginations brings them closer to the situation, thus making them want it in actuality even more. The only source of light in the room comes from the right side, which accents a seat on the couch directly out of sight right next to the subject. This brings the audience even closer to the aforementioned exclusivity as to say "there is a spot right here for you, just go buy a Bentley."
An alternative interpretation of this advertisement might be that it is unnecessary and offensive. While this would largely depend on the context, it is not fair to speak solely in terms of the intended audience. This ad could make some people feel a strong sense of discomfort, anger, or even disgust. This could be the result of (1) the offensive hand gesture the subject is presenting, or (2) the blatant expression of wealth as a means of entitlement. It is unlikely that this would matter in terms of successful marketing for Bentley, but it is relevant in analyzing the pathos of the image. The rooms vague presentation could easily become a very evil representation of social hierarchy for those who this advertisement is not directed, or those who find obscene gestures and gross displays of wealth offensive.
Blogging...
I have never had a blog before and think that I am having a little bit of trouble adapting to the casual nature of it... Whenever I think about making these blog posts it seems more daunting than it probably should. I thought that just saying this on the blog might be good practice for me.
Aristotle Book II Ch. 12-26
From Book II Chapter 15:
"In the generations of men as in the fruits of the earth, there is a varying yield; now and then, where the stock is good, exception men are produced for a while, and then decadence sets in. A clever stock will degenerate towards the insane type of character, like the descendants of Alcibiades or of the elder Dionysius; a steady stock towards the fatuous and torpid type, like the descendants of Cimon, Pericles, and Socrates."
I feel that this claim showcases the micro-perspective that haunts Aristotle's rationalizations of character. This statement ignores the various factors on a macroscopic level which, in my opinion, have a much greater influence on what Aristotle calls the degeneration of a clever stock.
When I first read this passage I felt as though I could identify with it. I felt that I was the clever stock succumbing to decadence. However, after thinking about it I realized that Aristotle's logic is flawed. Decadence does not set it as a result of the "stock" becoming accustomed to a lifestyle. This decadence in actuality is a facade. His rationalization of good stock is far to vulnerable to the fluctuations in almost every general state of affairs to be a legitimate contribution to the decline of a group. More often than we like to admit, as it makes us feel of little importance, we are the result of a much bigger picture.
I think it would be interesting if Aristotle were to argue that these two things go hand in hand. But, yet again, I am left with Aristotle's classic broad interpretation of things.
"In the generations of men as in the fruits of the earth, there is a varying yield; now and then, where the stock is good, exception men are produced for a while, and then decadence sets in. A clever stock will degenerate towards the insane type of character, like the descendants of Alcibiades or of the elder Dionysius; a steady stock towards the fatuous and torpid type, like the descendants of Cimon, Pericles, and Socrates."
I feel that this claim showcases the micro-perspective that haunts Aristotle's rationalizations of character. This statement ignores the various factors on a macroscopic level which, in my opinion, have a much greater influence on what Aristotle calls the degeneration of a clever stock.
When I first read this passage I felt as though I could identify with it. I felt that I was the clever stock succumbing to decadence. However, after thinking about it I realized that Aristotle's logic is flawed. Decadence does not set it as a result of the "stock" becoming accustomed to a lifestyle. This decadence in actuality is a facade. His rationalization of good stock is far to vulnerable to the fluctuations in almost every general state of affairs to be a legitimate contribution to the decline of a group. More often than we like to admit, as it makes us feel of little importance, we are the result of a much bigger picture.
I think it would be interesting if Aristotle were to argue that these two things go hand in hand. But, yet again, I am left with Aristotle's classic broad interpretation of things.
Sunday, February 6, 2011
Aristotle Book II Ch. 1-11
Whenever I found myself questioning Aristotle's logic in chapters 1-11, I simply read a paragraph ahead and found him debunking my argument. It seems that he speaks so generally, it is hard to find something I disagree with or have to deeply ponder. I feel that part of what made him such a great rhetorician was his ability to speak in broad terms, yet still, at least seemingly, make profound statements. Chapters 1-11, generally speaking, stated the obvious. He tells us what we already know, even if we have never actually sounded it out. He says "of those we have wronged, and of our enemies or rivals, it is not the passionate and outspoken whom we have to fear, but the quiet, dissembling, unscrupulous; since we never know when they are upon us, we can never be sure they are at a safe distance," he then goes on to say "all terrible things are more terrible if they give us no chance of retrieving a blunder...things are also worse which we cannot, or cannot easily, help. Speaking generally, anything causes us to feel fear that when it happens to, or threatens, others causes us to feel pity." He makes a bold claim about the mysterious threats being the most profound, and then goes on to speak extremely broadly about the idea of fear manifesting itself in anything we can relate to. When I read chapters 1-11 I found myself wondering if I was actually gaining any perspective. I know that, for the most part, what he is saying is true. However, I am unsure if what I am reading is actually all that profound. I also wonder if Aristotle considers his rationalizations of emotion to be finite and innate, or ,if given different circumstances, an emotion could be redefined. By this I mean are these descriptions something that we are conditioned to feel, are they something we are born to feel, or possibly a combination of both? I am not sure if I can clearly iterate the linkage I am trying to make here. I feel that he makes these general claims that I can relate to, but I don't feel that he gives me a better understanding of the nature of my emotions. Experience and perspective are so ingrained and so relative to an understanding of emotion that it is hard to rationalize emotion without giving some view of self. When reading texts which make claims about human beings it is important to decipher the authors opinion on human nature. I think it is clear that Aristotle believes that human beings are innately bad. This leads me to believe that his opinions on emotion are, at least largely,something he deems innate as well.
Wednesday, January 26, 2011
Enargeia Assignment
It is an unsettling anxious discomfort, a nuisance that turns into something genuinely crippling. Beginning as merely a tingling sensation it grows exponentially in what seems like an instant. As my discontent erupts into an animalistic necessity my mind begins to rationalize the social implications, and legal ramifications, of public urination. Relief awaits me in an almost infinite number of locations, yet all too often I find myself stranded in a toilet-less chasm. I nearly lose control of my bladder as I demolish the door which obstructs my release. The sanctity of this moment is immediately calming. I am relieved.
Tuesday, January 25, 2011
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